Abstract: In view of the issue of private car travel mode selection, HOT (high-occupancy toll/ lanes) lanes features were introduced. An evolutionary game model of strategic choice between management departments and travelers was constructed. The influence of management costs, charging policy, choosing HOT lanes by solo drivers and other related factors on the evolution results was analyzed. The results show that: 1) the steady state of final convergence under different initial ratios is (1, 1), and the larger the initial ratio, the faster the convergence speed; 2) the charging for non-combiners, the management costs, and the ratio of the non-combiners who choose driving on HOT lanes will have a greater impact on the outcome of the game; 3) when the charge for non-combiners is higher than a certain value, it is the best game state for the management department to set HOT lanes and the travelers to choose the carpool mode, which provides a reference for the management department to set HOT lanes to encourage the travelers to choose the carpool mode and make toll policy.

Key words: traffic and transportation engineering, travel model selection, HOT(high-occupancy toll/lanes) lanes, carpool , evolutionary game

摘要： 针对私家车出行方式选择问题，引入HOT(high-occupancy toll)车道特征，构建了管理部门和出行者之间策略选择演化博弈模型，并分析了管理成本、收费政策、独驾者选择行驶HOT车道等相关因素对演化结果的影响。结果表明：不同初始比例下最终收敛的稳定状态都为(1,1)，并且初始比例越大，收敛速度越快；对非合乘者的收费、管理成本以及选择行驶HOT车道的非合乘者比例对博弈结果都会产生较大影响；对非合乘者的收费高于一定值时，管理部门设置HOT车道及出行者选择合乘方式是最佳博弈状态。

关键词: 交通运输工程, 出行方式选择, HOT车道, 合乘, 演化博弈