关键词: 交通工程, 无信号交叉口, 重复博弈, 交通冲突, Nash均衡

Abstract: In order to study the driver’s decision-making behaviors of the conflict vehicles in non-signalized intersection, according to the driver’s personality factors and the relative potential factors in the different strategies which affect the driver to make decisions, as well as the time refinement, the utility function of the driver’s behaviors based on the dynamic reduplicate game theory was built up from the view of game theory. As the decision-making behavior by the driver in the process of cross-road, analyzing the different combination of the utility of the driver’s decision-making behavior, Nash equilibrium was existed in a single game process, and the driver’s optimal decision behaviors in a dynamic game was obtained. The illustration shows that impulse drivers in the decision-making period of time are more willing to choose to accelerate the first strategy; mild drivers prefer to choose accelerate the preemptive strategy or maintain uniform strategy; cautious drivers prefer to choose to maintain uniform strategy or deceleration comity strategy.

Key words: traffic engineering, non-signalized intersection, reduplicate game, traffic conflict, Nash equilibrium