中文核心期刊
CSCD来源期刊
中国科技核心期刊
RCCSE中国核心学术期刊

Journal of Chongqing Jiaotong University(Natural Science) ›› 2026, Vol. 45 ›› Issue (3): 111-119.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1674-0696.2026.03.13

• Traffic & Transportation+Artificial Intelligence • Previous Articles    

Power Battery Recycling of New Energy Vehicles under Dynamic and Static Rewards and Punishments

LIU Yunlong1, WANG Wei1, NIU Li2, WANG Ligang3   

  1. (1. School of Economics and Management, Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing 400064, China; 2. Zouping Transportation Bureau, Binzhou 256200, Shandong, China; 3. School of Traffic and Transportation, Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing 400074, China)
  • Received:2025-06-20 Revised:2025-12-19 Published:2026-03-24

动静态奖惩下新能源汽车动力电池回收研究

刘云龙1,王微1,牛丽2,王礼刚3   

  1. (1. 重庆交通大学 经济与管理学院,重庆 400064; 2. 邹平市交通运输局,山东 滨州 256200; 3. 重庆交通大学 交通运输学院,重庆 400074)
  • 作者简介:刘云龙(1983—),男,安徽亳州人,教授,博士,主要从事交通经济及管理方面的研究。E-mail:longyun768@126.com。 通信作者:王微(2001—),女,四川成都人,硕士研究生,主要从事交通经济、新能源汽车方面的研究。E-mail:2679835272@qq.com。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社科基金项目(21BJY038);重庆市教委科技重点项目(KJZD-K202200707);重庆市教委规划项目(20SKGH092);重庆市教育委员会人文社科项目(23SKGH135)

Abstract: Aiming at the problems such as the low recycling rate in the field of power battery recycling and the risk of environmental pollution caused by informal recycling, a tripartite evolutionary game model was established, including new energy vehicle manufacturers, consumers and the government. Based on the bounded rationality assumption of decision-makers, the replication dynamic equation, Jacobian matrix stability analysis and MATLAB numerical simulation technology were used to explore the strategy evolution law under the dynamic and static reward and punishment mechanism. The research finds that the strategic shift of decision-makers is comprehensively affected by multiple parameters, such as the intensity of government rewards and punishments, manufacturers’ recycling technology level, and consumers’ environmental preference coefficients. Under the static reward and punishment mechanism, system evolution has obvious fluctuations, and the evolution rate is slow. While the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism ensures a stable evolutionary process with significantly accelerated speed, through adaptive adjustments of linkage supervision rate and recycling rate. Based on these results, this study proposes suggestions such as establishing a dynamic reward and punishment algorithm, implementing a technical compliance certification system, and compressing the profit margins of informal channels, aiming to provide theoretical support and decision-making basis for the accurate formulation and continuous optimization of power battery recycling policy.

Key words: traffic engineering; new energy vehicles; power battery recycling; evolutionary game; dynamic supervision

摘要: 针对动力电池回收领域回收率低及非正规回收导致环境污染风险等问题,构建了关于新能源汽车制造商、消费者和政府的三方演化博弈模型。基于决策主体有限理性假设,运用复制动态方程、雅可比矩阵稳定性分析和MATLAB数值仿真技术,探究动静态奖惩机制下的策略演化规律。研究发现:决策主体策略转变受政府奖惩力度、制造商回收技术水平、消费者环境偏好系数等多参数综合影响;静态奖惩机制下,系统演化存在明显波动且演化速率慢;而动态奖惩机制通过联动监管率和回收率自适应调整,演化进程平稳且速率显著加快。基于这些结果,研究提出建立动态奖惩算法、实行技术达标认证制度、压缩非正规渠道利润空间等建议,旨在为动力电池回收政策的精准制定和不断优化提供理论支持和决策依据。

关键词: 交通工程;新能源汽车;动力电池回收;演化博弈;动态监管

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