Abstract: We consider the first price sealed auction which the biddersutility functions is u (x) =xa (0 0,i =1,2), for sufficiently large one of βi the auction is not pareto efficient

Key words: the first price sealed auction , three types attitudes toward risk , asymmetry auction , The Bayes-Nash equilibrium bidding strategy

摘要： 运用博弈论中不完全信息的贝叶斯均衡分析了常相对风险投标人在第一价格密封招标中的投标策略，得到 了在独立的私人价值下对称的投标人和非对称的投标人在风险厌恶、风险中性和风险追求时的投标策略

关键词: 第一价格密封拍卖, 常相对风险, 非对称拍卖, 贝叶斯纳什均衡