中文核心期刊
CSCD来源期刊
中国科技核心期刊
RCCSE中国核心学术期刊

Journal of Chongqing Jiaotong University(Natural Science) ›› 2006, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (1): 132-133.

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The analyzing with incomplete information game theory for the cost of constructive acceleration

LiU Wei,WANG Yu   

  1. Management College,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China
  • Received:2004-12-10 Revised:2005-03-15 Online:2006-02-15 Published:2015-05-18

关于赶工费用的不完全信息博弈分析

刘伟,王羽   

  1. 重庆交通学院管理学院,重庆 400074
  • 作者简介:刘伟(1981—),男,山东滨州人,硕士生,主要研究方向:工程经济与工程项目管理.

Abstract: The course of signing”Constructive Acceleration Contract”is also the course of gaming among owner and contractor about the cost. The study of this paper is based on their game strategies and bring forward the game model in order to guide the negotiation and realize more excellent economic efficiency.

Key words: constructive acceleration, bayesian nash equilibrium, incomplete information, game theory, payoffs

摘要: 业主与承包商签订“赶工附加协议”的过程是双方针对赶工费用博弈的过程,本文分析了双方的谈判策略,并 运用博弈模型进行了均衡分析,以期能指导双方的谈判,实现更优的经济效率.

关键词: 赶工, 贝叶斯纳什均衡, 不完全信息, 博弈论, 得益

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