中文核心期刊
CSCD来源期刊
中国科技核心期刊
RCCSE中国核心学术期刊

Journal of Chongqing Jiaotong University(Natural Science) ›› 2004, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (4): 85-89.

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How to against the collusion of road passenger transportation inside problem

LIN Wu , 1, 2  HUANG Cheng-feng , 1  YANG Xiu-tai2   

  1. 1.School of Economics and Management, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China; 2.Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing 400074,China
  • Received:2003-10-16 Online:2004-08-15 Published:2015-05-18

谈防范道路客运中的串谋问题

林武12,黄承锋1,杨秀苔2   

  1. 1.重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044;2.重庆交通学院,重庆400074
  • 作者简介:林武(1966—),男,黑龙江佳木斯人,讲师,在职博士生,从事技术经济与管理研究

Abstract: Collusion is a serious problem, at the same time, is a very tough problem again, in road passenger transportation;This text analyze to collusion the formative and inside mechanism ,is base on game talking about foundation of entrust the agency theories;Make use of the rules system theories, mechanism how to against collusion is designed in road passenger transportation

Key words: entrust the agency, road passenger transportation, collusion benefit, decentralization power mechanism

摘要: 在道路客运中的串谋始终是一个较为严重的问题,同时,又是一个非常棘手的问题;本文运用建立在博弈论 基础上的委托代理理论,分析了串谋形成的内在机理,并设计了在道路客运中如何防范串谋的机制.

关键词: 委托代理, 道路客运, 串谋受益, 分权机制

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