Abstract: To address the difficulty of urban parking, a management strategy for urban parking lots based on the Stackelberg game theory was proposed, which involved the joint decision-making of parking lot operators and traffic managers. Firstly, to tackle the intricate interplay among parkers, parking lot operators and traffic managers, the influence among these three participants was analyzed from the perspective of game theory, and the corresponding utility functions for the three participants were established. Secondly, to minimize the conflict of interests between traffic managers and parking lot operators, a game model of these three parties was established based on Stackelberg game theory, and the principles of real-time parking lot access management were determined. Then, based on numerical simulation, the differential evolution algorithm and Kriging agent model were combined to solve the proposed game model, and the corresponding parking reservation management plan and tripartite utility were obtained. Finally, the scheme based on the Stackelberg game was compared with the scheme of maximizing the interests of parking lot operators through numerical simulation. The research results show that in the three scenarios of high, medium and low traffic flow of mainline, the Stackelberg game scheme is the one with the smallest conflict of interests among all parties.

Key words: traffic engineering; urban transportation; traffic control; Stackelberg game; surrogate model

摘要： 为了解决城市停车难问题，基于Stackelberg博弈论提出了停车场运营者与交通管理者共同决策的城市停车场管理策略。针对停车者、停车场运营者和交通管理者的交互关系，从博弈论角度分析了这三方参与者之间的影响，并建立了这三方参与者的相应效用函数；以交通管理者与停车场运营者利益主体矛盾最小化为目标，基于Stackelberg博弈建立了这三方的博弈模型，确定了实时停车场进出管理原则；基于数值仿真将差分进化算法与Kriging代理模型进行联立对博弈模型进行求解，得到相应停车预约管理方案及三方效用；通过数值仿真将基于Stackelberg博弈得到的方案与停车场运营者利益最大化方案进行对比分析。研究结果表明：在主线流量大、中、小三种情景下，基于Stackelberg博弈方案是各方利益矛盾最小的方案。

关键词: 交通工程；城市交通；交通控制；Stackelberg博弈；代理模型