Journal of Chongqing Jiaotong University(Natural Science) ›› 2005, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (5): 113-118.
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LI Jian—zhang
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李建章
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Abstract: This paper investigate the optimal incentive contract with adverse selection and moral hazard in road transportation market management.The result has been used to analyse incentive effect for one type of monitoring form in management of transportation qulity
Key words: road transportation, market management, principal agent, adverse selection, moral hazard, incentive contract
摘要： 文中将信息经济学的不可观察行动的道德风险和同时存在逆向选择和道德风险的理论用于研究道路运输市 场管理中的最优激励合同。结果用于分析运输市场质量招投标中一类监督模式的激励效应
关键词: 道路运输, 市场管理, 委托代理, 道德风险, 逆向选择, 激励合同
CLC Number:
F062.1
U116.1
LI Jian—zhang. Optimal incentive mechanisam with asymmetry information in road transportation market management[J]. Journal of Chongqing Jiaotong University(Natural Science), 2005, 24(5): 113-118.
李建章. 不对称信息下道路运输市场管理中的最优激励机制[J]. 重庆交通大学学报（自然科学版）, 2005, 24(5): 113-118.
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