中文核心期刊
CSCD来源期刊
中国科技核心期刊
RCCSE中国核心学术期刊

Journal of Chongqing Jiaotong University(Natural Science) ›› 2018, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (11): 112-118.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1674-0696.2018.11.18

• Traffic & Transportation Engineering • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Research on the Selection and Simulation of Port Co-operation Strateg Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

LAI Chengshou1, LV Jing1, LI Hui2, GAO Tianhang1   

  1. (1. Transportation Management College, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian 116026, Liaoning, P. R. China; 2. School of Management Science and Engineering, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, Liaoning, P. R. China)
  • Received:2017-06-14 Revised:2017-08-25 Online:2018-11-19 Published:2018-11-19

基于演化博弈的港口竞合策略选择及仿真研究

赖成寿1,吕靖1,李慧2,高天航1   

  1. (1. 大连海事大学 交通运输管理学院,辽宁 大连 116026; 2. 大连理工大学 管理科学与工程学院,辽宁 大连 116024)
  • 作者简介:赖成寿(1988—),男,湖北随州人,博士研究生,主要从事港口经济、交通规划与管理方面的研究。E-mail:laichengshou@163.com。 通信作者:吕靖(1959—),男,吉林长春人,教授,博士生导师,主要从事交通运输规划与管理方面的研究。E-mail:lujing@dlmu.edu.cn。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(71473023);中央高校基本科研业务费用专项项目(3132016359)

Abstract: Taking evolutionary game theory and cooperation-competition game theory as the main theoretical instrument, the choice of competition or cooperation of port was studied based on bounded rationality and hypothesis of incomplete information. The bi-level modelofport competition or cooperation model was constructed, and the income distribution of the cooperative alliance was distributed by the shapely value;the parameters such as “income distribution coefficient”, “cooperative cost”, “incremental incremental income” and “default compensation”were introduced into the evolutionary game model which was established to analyze the stability of the equilibrium point of the evolution of the port, and the simulation analysis of the evolution path of the port competition was carried out by MATLAB R2010b. The results show that the evolutionary equilibrium and the evolution path are affected by the initial state selection, the “incremental income of cooperation”, “income distribution coefficient”, “cooperation cost”, “default income” and “default compensation”. Finally, the countermeasures for the stability of port cooperation was put forward so that the cooperation will become the only evolutionary and stable balance to ensure the coordinated development of the port.

Key words: traffic and transportation engineering, cooperation or competition game, evolutionary game, replicator dynamics, evolutionary stability strategy, simulation

摘要: 基于有限理性、不完全信息假设,运用竞合博弈和演化博弈理论探究港口竞合行为策略选择的内在机理和长期演变规律。构建了港口竞合博弈双层规划模型,运用shapely值对合作联盟的收益进行分配;引入“收益分配系数”、“合作成本”、“违约增量收益”、“违约补偿金”等参数构造港口博弈非对称得益矩阵,在此基础上建立演化博弈模型,对港口演化博弈均衡点的稳定性进行分析,并通过MATLAB R2010b对港口竞合演化路径的进行仿真。研究结论表明:演化稳定均衡点以及演化路径受初始状态选择、“合作收益增量”、“收益分配系数”、“合作成本”、“违约收益”、“违约补偿金”等参数影响。最后,针对演化影响参数提出使双方合作成为唯一进化稳定均衡的措施建议,确保港口协作发展。

关键词: 交通运输工程, 竞合博弈, 演化博弈, 复制动态, 演化稳定策略, 仿真

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