Abstract: Aiming at the problems of uneven development of new energy vehicle market, insufficient core technological innovation and lack of government support, a tripartite evolutionary game model of government, enterprises and consumers based on game theory knowledge was established, trying to study the interaction mechanism among the three main bodies in the new energy vehicle industry. The evolutionary stability strategy of the proposed model was obtained by game analysis. The results show that: the unilateral evolution strategy of the government, the automobile enterprises and the consumers will be affected by the other two main strategies at the same time; in a specific situation, when the government implements subsidy decline, different levels of incentives will not change the final decision of the automobile enterprises, but the evolution speed of the automobile enterprises will change with the subsidies. The research conclusions provide references for the scientific and sustainable development of new energy vehicles in the “post subsidy era”.

Key words: traffic and transportation engineering, evolutionary game, new energy vehicle, government subsidies

摘要： 针对新能源汽车市场发展不均匀、核心技术创新不够、政府扶持欠缺等问题，基于博弈论知识，构建了政府、企业及消费者的三方演化博弈模型，试图研究新能源汽车行业中3个主体之间的互动机制，通过博弈分析得出该模型的演化稳定策略。结果表明：政府、车企和消费者单方的演化策略会同时受到其他两方主体策略的影响；在特定情境下，当政府实施补贴退坡时，不同水平的激励并不会改变车企的最后决策，但是车企行为的演化速度会随着补贴变化。研究结论为我国新能源汽车在“后补贴时代”可持续科学发展提供参考。

关键词: 交通运输工程, 演化博弈, 新能源汽车, 政府补贴